Swarthmore College

Works
Philosophy Faculty Works

Philosophy

2007

The Ends Of Narrative
Richard Thomas Eldridge
Swarthmore College, reldrid1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Richard Thomas Eldridge. (2007). "The Ends Of Narrative". A Sense Of The World: Essays On Fiction,
Narrative, And Knowledge. Volume 6, 138-150.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/524

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

10 The ends of narrative
Richard Eldridge

We can begin to approach what might be called the peculiarity of literature as a
form of cognitive practice by comparing how literary works end with how other
pieces of intellectual work end. A proof in mathematics ends by reaching its final
line, where each line that is not an axiom is generated in explicit accord with a
rule of inference that in principle anyone might follow. Reports of experimental
results generated in a lab specify procedures that were followed in setting up
equipment and carrying out tests. While they often also offer conjectural inter
pretations of results and suggestions for further work, they describe minimally a
procedure that anyone might follow in order to achieve a like-enough result.
Hence we can speak readily of objective evidence that a certain state of affairs
can be produced so-and-so. In statistical social science, one finds reports of
results from questionnaires or other data about populations expressed in
numerical terms. Under the assumption that a larger population will not be too
different from a sample, one can draw conclusions about distributions of traits
and tendencies of development. History undertakes to tell us what happened,
and the claims of professional historians are supported with reference to primary
sources, indicated in footnotes. In economics, one often finds abstract mathe
matical models that describe processes of income distribution or GNP growth,
for example, that are imagined to occur underneath a confusing surface of extra
variables that induce deviations from the model. Among these cognitive prac
tices, literature is perhaps most like economics in giving a model of certain
processes in the world. This is scant comfort, however, since whether the pro
cesses described by economic models really do occur, on the one hand, or are
rather fairy tales invented by clever calculators, on the other, is itself a subject of
more than a little dispute. Literary models, moreover, if that is what literary
texts offer us, are in even worse shape, since they focus only on very small
numbers of mostly made-up cases, and they lack even the potential of refine
ment through the incorporation of further data.
Instead of focusing on literature as a form of cognitive work, then, we might
think of works of literature as aiming at producing a certain sort of pleasure.
Like an ice cream cone, works of literature might then end just when there is no
more pleasure to be gotten from the materials at hand. Their point is exhausted
in their consumption, and there is not much more to be said than this. This
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view is unsatisfying, however, in that the experience of reading a good novel is
not really much like the experience of eating an ice cream cone or wallowing in
a warm bath. It takes some work to pay attention. It is not exactly fun at every
instant. The pleasure, if that is the right word, seems not to have much to do with
sensory processes, but more with the work that the reader is doing. And surely
writers are trying to do something that is both cognitively available to their
audiences and cognitively significant. But then, again, works of literature do not
offer us results that are much like those of mathematics, laboratory science,
history, or statistical social science. So we are faced with a puzzle. We seem to
learn something from reading literature, but we have trouble explaining exactly
how or what we learn - at least when we are in the grip of a certain picture of
knowledge as the methodologically correct achievement of a replicable result.
It is easy to suggest that there must be a third way - between the forms of
knowledge that are available in other disciplines and mere, predominantly sen
sible pleasure - in which literature is significant. We can see that this suggestion
makes sense when we contrast art in general with scientific knowledge, on the
one hand, and decoration and entertainment, on the other. Art is somehow in
the middle here. If we are offered too much scientific knowledge by a particular
work, then we are likely to find it didactic and to want more pleasure. If we are
offered too much pleasure, we are likely to find the work either decorative or an
escapist guilty pleasure, like the novels of Ian Fleming or Dan Brown, say. We
want, at least sometimes, to work harder and to learn more than that. But just
how can we do this? The mere postulation of a third way does not yet answer
this question.
In their valuable comprehensive survey Truth, Fiction, and literature, Peter
Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen explore a number of ways of thinking
about literature as a source of knowledge. Centrally, they consider the following
three suggestions. ( 1) Literary works might help us to know 'what it is like' to be
or to be in the situation of a certain character, in the sense of 'subjective
knowledge' that has been broached by Thomas Nagel and worked out with
regard to literature by Dorothy Walsh. Against this, Lamarque and Olsen object
first that while we have experiences while reading, we mostly have our own
experiences, not the experiences of Leda or Leopold Bloom, Yeats or Joyce. In
particular, we mostly observe or imagine characters having experiences. And
while we take an interest in this observation, we are not learning the felt qualia
of, say, fried kidney for Leopold Bloom. Second, even if we did get some sense
of what things are like for characters from reading literary fiction, it is strained,
Lamarque and Olsen suggest, to describe what we get as learning something.
There are no methods in view for accrediting or testing any knowledge claims,
such as there are in the sciences, and much of what we might think we learn, we
must in fact already have known in order to understand what is going on: for
example that rape is a violent, terrifying, and world-altering experience. 1 Or
(2) literary works might enable us to enrich our store of concepts, or they might
modify our sense of the application conditions of concepts we already have, as
Catherine Wilson and D. Z. Phillips have suggested. Against this suggestion,
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Lamarque and Olsen object that while some literary works might help us to
deploy new concepts or to widen the application conditions of concepts we
already have, this is by no means necessary for a work to have literary value.
Second, and more sharply, they suggest that some authors sometimes explore
the same concepts and conditions of application in different works, so that when
one reads a second work, for example, a later play by Ibsen, one may not learn
anything new. But the later work nonetheless has literary value, so that learning
about concepts and their application conditions is not necessary for literary value
(pp. 378-86). Or (3) it might be that literary works help us to become better
perceivers of the moral lives of persons and so better reasoners about what it is
good or right to do when, as Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam have sug
gested. Against this suggestion, Lamarque and Olsen object first, that improve
ment in moral reasoning is by no means brought about by all successful literary
works, and second, that having or furthering the correct valuational stance is not
a necessary condition for literary value: we can and do value as successful lit
erature works with whose stances and points of view we disagree (pp. 386-94).
One might suspect that there is something wrong here with Lamarque and
Olsen's "divide and dismiss" strategy. Perhaps what we get from reading litera
ture is some mixture of subjective knowledge, improvement of our conceptual
capacities, and moral insight. Lamarque and Olsen themselves offer the positive
suggestion that literature "develops themes that are only vaguely felt or for
mulated in daily life and gives them a 'local habitation and a name "' (p. 452).2
"Giving a name" at least hints that some sort of cognitive achievement is on
offer. Literary appreciation, they further remark, "constitutes its own form of
insight, its own kind of interpretation of thematic concepts" (p. 409). But this
form of insight, they argue, is better construed as the cultivation of understanding
than as the acquisition of knowledge of true propositions. "Literary works can
contribute to the development and understanding of the deepest, most revered
of a culture's conceptions without advancing propositions, statements, or hypotheses
about them" (p. 22). "We can imagine, ponder, entertain thoughts, or speculate
about something without any commitment to the truth of our ruminations"
(p. 11). Literary practice is best understood as an imaginative exploration of
themes that is guided by the literary work, which undertakes "to develop
in depth, through subject and form, a theme which is in some sense central to
human concerns" (p. 450).
But while this talk of understanding is a good start, it leaves us not so far
beyond where we were before. Exactly what do we understand when we
understand the theme of a literary work? How is this understanding related to,
but different from, propositional knowledge that the author thought thus-and
so? How is this understanding cultivated by the experience of the work itself ?
What, if anything, makes it valuable in human life?
John Gibson suggests that the important cognitive work of literature consists
in "bringing into full view our standards of representation [andj our linguistic
criteria for what the world is."3 A literary work may show some phenomenon
'just as it is" (p. 61 ); for example, we may see the essence of racism in the figure
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of Iago (pp. 61-62). Shakespeare's presentation of Iago "draws together at ... a
level of clarity and order everything we call racism" (p. 63), thus making the
shape of our concept available to us for acknowledgment. This suggestion too is
a useful start. But what it fails so far to explain is how we can fail to know the
criteria of some of our concepts and, hence, why we need to explore and
acknowledge them. Surely we need already to have some pretty clear command
of the concept of racism in order to understand Iago's actions at all. What fur
ther dimensions of our concept, then, are subject to repression or forgetting, and
how do the details of the presentation of Iago as a literary character activate
these dimensions? What, exactly, is the cognitive import of having our concepts
activated and somehow "filled-in"?4
Gibson further suggests that a general reason why we turn to works of lit
erature is that we are able there to "read the story of our shared form of life" (p.
50). This is the suggestion we must pursue, if we are to have any hope of
unpacking the jointly cognitive and emotional work of acknowledging and
working through themes and concepts that reading literature makes available to
us. So what is the story of our form of life? This enormous question is one that
will have to be faced, if we are to make any progress here.
Part of that story is the playing out of a biologically engendered imperative to
survive. We need to eat, sleep, protect ourselves, and procreate in order to sur
vive as a species, and we are, so far, wired well enough for success in these
endeavors. In the absence of extraordinary strength or speed, we have managed
to cope with our environments mostly through superior cunning. We are better
at recognizing and manipulating more features of our environment than are
members of other species. In particular, as concept-mongering creatures, we are
able not only to see objects brutely, as it were, as members of kinds; we are also
able to see them from a point of view, as this or that. For example, a stick may
be recognized by us as a weapon, a piece of building material, an implement for
drawing in the sand, or a staff. A fundamental part of learning language is devel
oping this repertoire of seeing an object as something. We manage this achieve
ment not simply through picking up on the individuals-just-sorted-into-natural
kinds that are present in our environment. Other animals do this as well, but
lack our conceptual repertoire. My dog responds to the sound of my car, but
does not think of the car as a station wagon or a Volvo. We, however, manage
feats like this by picking up not only on our environments brutely, but also by
picking up on how others are interacting with our shared environment, by
picking up on their points of view on things.5 Our having a wide repertoire of
concepts and application criteria, enabling manifold different responses to our
environment, is not a matter only of matching inner idea, or Platonic archetype,
or brain state with object. It is a matter of learning to see things within multiple
and shifting contexts of engagement and use, a matter of catching on to a large
number of things that are done or might be done, by others and by oneself, at
once with objects and with words, within practical engagements. In coming to
be masters of words that encode objects, phenomena, and events seen in one
way or another, in relation to multiple contexts of engagement and possible
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response, we are not machines and not the quasi-automatons of Wittgenstein's
language-game (2) in Phiwsophical Investigations. Rather we are creatures who have
become capable of a life of plastic attention - capable, that is, of culture.
The fact that we develop conceptual consciousness not only in relation to
problems of biological survival, but also in relation to cultural contexts of flexible
attention and engagement brings with it certain distinctive burdens and possibi
lities. Not only is one trying to survive, one is trying to play the game of attending
under concepts both with others and in competition with others to have one's
own point of view and way of playing the game recognized. Concepts and words,
for all that they register features of our environment that are there to be regis
tered, are also, in their life within cultural contexts of shifting attention and
engagement, stable enough to permit communication and sharing of a point of
view on things and tolerant of new uses as new contexts ·of attention and interest
develop. 6 Hence coming to language and conceptual consciousness brings with it
uncertainties about how to go on from where we are or one is. Am I playing the
game in the right way? Is my conceptual performance such that it can and
should be taken up by others? Do I really know what I'm doing? 7 What are evi
dent and exemplary fluency and command in making moves with concepts?
These questions are such that they cannot and do not arise at every moment;
comprehensive skepticism is not a genuinely available stance in life. But they are
also such that they can always arise at some point. As the Kantian tradition
emphasizes, a life with concepts is a life in which questions of judgm ent are
always potentially in view, and the fact of continuing responsibility in and for
conceptual performance is unavoidable. R. G. Collingwood tells the following
wonderful story about what it is like to come to conceptual consciousness and
language, thus becoming a subject of and in culture.
A child throws its bonnet off its head and into the road with the exclamation
"Hattiaw." By comparison with the self-conscious cry discussed earlier in the
present section, this represents a highly developed and sophisticated use of
language. To begin with, consider the emotion involved. The child might
remove its bonnet because it felt physically uncomfortable in it, hot or tickled
or the like; but the satisfaction expressed by the cry of "Hattiaw" is not a
merely psycho-physical pleasure like that of rubbing a fly off the nose. What
is expressed is a sense of triumph, an emotion arising out of the possession of
self-consciousness. The child is proving itself as good a man as its mother,
who has previously taken its bonnet off with the words it is now imitating;
better than its mother, because now she has put the bonnet on and wants it
to stay on, so there is a conflict of wills in which the child feels himself victor. 8
As this example shows, even very early on in our life as possessors of conceptual
consciousness and self-consciousness, we bear distinctive emotions and attitudes
toward our situations. We are capable of accepting, working through, and
expressing these emotions, •with a resulting sense of a certain kind of triumph,
when our point of view is recognized by others through our performances. We
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are capable also of sullenly shirking our emotions, avoiding them, or otherwise
failing to express them, with a consequent sense of disappointment, frustration,
and failure, and, sometimes, with a further wish to escape or reject the burdens
of the responsibility for expression. When this happens, we then suffer or merely
undergo our emotions, as we remain stuck in the state of having what Spinoza
calls an inadequate idea of an affection: we don't know what is worth caring
about; we take no delight in the investment of our energies in our performances,
and confused, unexpressed feelings wash over us.9 Our actions are as much
reactions as expressions of our selfhood. Philosophical skepticism and its intimate
antagonist epistemological realism are both at bottom misbegotten intellectualized
efforts to repudiate the situation and expressive possibilities of conceptual con
sciousness and self-consciousness by describing them away. (What Stanley Cavell
calls the truth of skepticism is the fact that the skeptic, at least, registers a certain
failure and disappointment that attach to this effort. 10) More happily, however,
there are also what Charles Altieri calls "the kinds of satisfactions that are
available for agents simply because of the qualities of consciousness they bring to
what they are feeling." 11 We can do something with these qualities of con
sciousness. As Wordsworth argues in the Preface to Lyrical BaUads, the poet,
through thinking "long and deeply" in relation to our feelings may uncover
"what is really important to men," with the result that, when this course of dis
covery is taken up and followed, "the understanding of the Reader must neces
sarily be in some degree enlightened, and his affections strengthened and
purified." 12 Friedrich Holderlin on infinite satisfaction 13 and John Dewey on
consummatory experience describe in ·quite similar terms the distinctive sorts of
satisfactions that are open to us as human subjects. 14 The achievement of fur
ther understanding coupled with strengthened and purified affections, with both
understanding and affections then discharged in a dense, medium-specific per
formance of working through, in which a point of view is made manifest and
recognition and like-mindedness are successfully solicited, is what I have else
where called the achievement of expressive freedom. 15 It has, I think, some
claim to be regarded as an immanent telos of human life, made both possible,
partially, and valuable for us by our mysterious possession of conceptual con
sciousness and self-consciousness.
It is impossible to prove the correctness of this view according to the standards
of proof that are held in place in the Cartesian tradition. (Those standards were
specifically enforced in order to block talk of the purposes of things.) But it
remains nonetheless an articulation of what is going on in human life that may be
unavoidable and illuminating. If it has any chance of being right, then Lamarque
and Olsen are wrong when they remark that "Mostly, we simply do not meet the
grand themes in trivial daily life" (p. 455). Yes and no. Yes, we do not meet them
clearly formulated and perspicuously manifested there; there is too much muddle
for that, and there are too many different circumstances in which lives are led for
it to be just obvious that we are in pursuit of expressive freedom. But no, we do
meet these themes there latently, to be acknowledged, as we come to see our lives
as in part caught up in situ in the pursuit of expressive freedom.
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Great writers, then, manage to achieve expressiveness: that is, to face up to
and work through the emotions and attitudes that come with being a human
subject, as those emotions and attitudes are given specific contours in specific
situations. They make it manifest for themselves and for us how a specifically
shaped emotion, mood, or feeling has been brought about in or by a situation
and how, further, that emotion, mood, or feeling can be accepted as appro
priate. As a result, the emotion, mood, or feeling is actively accepted, not pas
sively suffered. Barbara Herrnstein Smith describes the achievement of poetic
closure from the reader's point of view in just these terms:
Closure occurs when the concluding portion of a poem creates in the reader
a sense of appropriate cessation. It announces and justifies the absence of
further development; it reinforces the feeling of finality, completion, and
composure which we value in all works of art; and it gives ultimate unity
and coherence to the reader's experience of the poem, by providing a point
from which all the preceding elements may be received comprehensively
and their relations grasped as part of a significant design.16
For the reader, that is to say, the poem itself is experienced as coherent, closed,
and designed, as its parts form a self-completing whole. This experience is a
function of form, but not of form alone. It occurs in part because the poet has
succeeded in making sense of experience and emotion, has succeeded in work
ing them through to achieve acceptance and composure. As Herrnstein Smith
notes, "the experience of closure is the complex product of both formal and
thematic elements" (p. 40). This means that the poet has found, formally, words
and structures to thematize, connect, and accept experiences and emotions that
were initially burdensome, troubling, exhilarating, or provocative. She goes on to
note that many contemporary poems, beginning with Eliot and reaching a high
point in Robert Lowell, exhibit increasingly "dialectical-associative" thematic
structure. "In much modern poetry," she remarks, "the occasion for a poem
is ... likely to be the existence of an ultimately unresolvable process" (p. 247).
There is what she calls a "poetry of non-statement" (p. 254) that takes both
subjective-lyrical-stream of consciousness guises and Objectivist-Imagist-Lan
guage Play guises. The reason for this development is that we have grown,
appropriately, skeptical of the availability and liveability of "they lived happily
ever after." Nineteenth-century novels, as both Henry James and David Lodge
mordantly remarked, seem to end only with marriage, death, or an inheritance.
In contrast, we have grown suspicious of the availability and value of these kinds
of closure in life, which seems to us to be more complicated than that. But even
in the contemporary poetry of anti-statement, the shape and feeling of a parti
cular instance of perplexity are expressively worked through, at least when
things go well. The writer and the reader afterwards come to know and accept
exactly how there are complexities of situation and feeling. As Herrnstein Smith
puts it, ''A poem allows us to know what we know, including our illusions and
desires, by giving us the language in which to acknowledge it" (p. 154). Such an
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achievement of acknowledgment is available and important for us just insofar as
we are human subjects who attempt to lead lives actively, with senses of meaning
and of appropriate responsiveness to events, unlike Nietzsche's cows, who do little
besides undergo their lives. 17 Unlike other animals, we remember and anticipate
incidents quite widely, together with an awareness of how incidents and things
are seen by others from multiple points of view. And so we wonder: who am I to
see, remember, and anticipate things like this? To what extent are my point of
view and emotions toward things apt and appropriate? Am I genuinely acting as
a reasonable subject in seeing things and feeling as I do?
In the grip of a healthy empiricism, it is of course possible to find this talk of
expressive freedom and of leading a life actively to be quite misplaced in rela
tion to what is after all also a sheerly material situation. There is, again, nothing
like a proof by Cartesian standards that expressive freedom is the immanent t,elos
of human life. But what does it look like, according to this conception, when
someone rejects it and denies that expressive freedom matters for us and that it
is partially, but only partially, available to us through different actions in differ
ent settings? (It is possible to say anything.) The Humean-skeptical, Darwinian
naturalist insistence that we are nothing but natural beings who must simply
cope with things and the Cartesian-Platonist insistence that absolute knowledge
of our place in nature can guide us, if we but somehow think aright, both
appear as hysteria-driven denials of what it is to be a finite, active being in time.
"You ask me," Nietzsche once wrote, "which of the philosophers' traits are
really idiosyncrasies? For example, their lack of historical sense, their hatred of
the very idea of becoming, their Egypticism. They think that they show their
respect for a subject when they de-historicize it, sub specie aeterni - when they turn
it into a mummy." 18 To deny that our lives are caught up in becoming and in
possibilities of the achievement of expressive freedom in part, but only in part,
in relation to it can look like an attempt to deny or kill human life, because it is
too painful.
Yet as Nietzsche also remarked, it can also sometimes happen - if and when
we manage ourselves to work through and express our emotions in a dense,
commanding performance, or if and when as readers we follow and participate
in the workings-through of others - that we are left with the sense, at least for a
time, "that life is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances,
indestructibly powerful and pleasurable." 19 A pattern can be discerned, partially
and dimly, in our relations as subjects to things and events, and emotions, feel
ings, attitudes, and moods can be experienced and worked through as appro
priate to that pattern. Discovery and exhilaration are mixed with a sense also of
mystery and complexity in the face of a becoming, a life in time, that is not
wholly masterable. For this reason, great endings, as Steven Winn remarks,
define and disappoint, frustrate and gratify. They confer meaning and confirm
the structure of what's come before - in a movie, a sonata, a work of fiction. But
they also kill off pleasure, snap us out of the dream, and clamp down order on
experience that we, as citizens of the modern world, believe to be open-ended,
ambigu ous, and unresolved.20
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This experience of an ending is like what Aristotle describes as the catharsis at once the clarification and unburdening - of an emotion in relation to a
situation. But, as Frank Kermode notes, whereas "For Aristotle the literary plot
was analogous to the plot of the world in that both were eductions from the
potency of matter,"21 which eductions are presided over purposively by divine
intelligence, for us the sense of plot in life proceeds at least in part from our own
"store of contrivances" (p. 40), as we are driven by "a need to live by [a] pat
tern" (p. 109). We half-believe in these patterns, as we experience our lives
within them and experience possibilities of clarification of our situation. And yet
we remain also aware of our own role as contrivers, aware of the lack of pre
siding pattern that is everywhere evident in human life, and aware also of our
own failures to live in perfect freedom and infinite satisfaction, in the face of the
mysterious complexities of becoming. And so we tell stories and attempt to work
through our emotions in relation to the particulars of changing situations, so
that we can, as Kermode puts it, both "avoid the regress into [a] myth" of pre
siding purposiveness and yet preserve the sense that "the scene [ef human sig
nificance] has not yet been finally and totally been struck" (p. 42). Fictions that
find plots, so as to work through emotions in relation to situations and experi
ences, remain for us both "deeply distrusted," since they are only our con
trivances, and "humanly indispensable," since only these contrivances can give
us the sense of leading a life meaningfully and actively. They offer us a way, even
the way, to cope with both anxiety at a sense of the pervasive contingency of
things and bad faith in fixed, master supernatural plots we can no longer trust
(p. 15 l ). They are our means of coping with "the tension or dissonance between
paradigmatic form and contingent reality" (p. 133), between the sense that every
life is a parable of each, with meaning to be found, and the sense that there is
only brute and empty material happenstance.
In a famous sonnet appearing as the first of his New Poems: Second Part ( 1908),
one of his so-called "Thing-poems," Rainer Maria Rilke describes what it is like
to come suddenly to a sense of our middle situation, between dead materiality
and perfect transcendence.

Archafscher Torso Apollos
Wir kannten nicht sein unerhortes Haupt,
darin die Augenapfel reiften. Aber
sein Torso gliiht noch wie ein Kandelaber,
in dem sein Schauen, nur zuriickgeschraubt,
sich halt und glanzt. Sonst konnte nicht der Bug
der Brust dich blenden, und im leisen Drehen
der Lenden konnte nicht ein Llcheln gehen
zu jener Mitte, die die Zeugung trug.
Sonst stiinde dieser Stein entstellt und kurz
unter der Schultern durchsichtigem Sturz
und flimmerte nicht so wie Raubtierfelle;
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und brachte nicht aus alien seinen Randern
aus wie ein Stern: denn da ist keine Stelle,
die dich nicht sieht. Du muBt dein Leben andern

Archaic Torso efApollo
We cannot know his legendary head
with eyes like ripening fruit. And yet his torso
is still suffused with brilliance from inside,
like a lamp, in which his gaze, now turned to low,
gleams in all its power. Otherwise
the curved breast could not dazzle you so, nor could
a smile run through the placid hips and thighs
to that dark center where procreation flared.
Otherwise this stone would seem defaced
beneath the translucent cascade of the shoulders
and would not glisten like a wild beast's fur:
would not, from all the borders of itself,
burst like a star: for here there is no place
that does not see you. You must change your life.
trans. Stephen Mitchell22
This poem describes not simply an object, but preeminently an experience of
an object. The statue-fragment is characterized above all in terms of its effect on
the speaker-viewer, in its overwhelming presence to a viewing consciousness.
Within that experience, the fragment presents itself as having an inside, felt as a
source of expressive and sexual power that is brought to fullness of presence in
its outer surface. The formed surface glows (gliiht), gleams (gliinzt), blinds the
viewer (dich bl,enden), bears a smile (ein lJicheln) as a promise of responsive sexu
ality. Its parts are not detached or misplaced (entstell�; instead the stone glistens
(jiimmerte) in its translucent falling (durchsichtigem Sturz), as though everywhere
breaking out of its borders (briichte aus al/,en seinen Riindern), as if seeing us from
every part of itself. These verbs describe the presence of what is inner in what is
outer. The statue-fragment is intensely expressively present, so that it serves as a
standing rebuke to us, who fail to bring our own personality, intelligence, and
expressive and sexual powers to full embodied expression, but instead live at
second-hand, palely under conventions that lack full life for us. Hence the frag
ment rebukes us for failing to be what we dimly feel we might and ought to be
as possessors of unexpressed inner intelligence and power: more fully animate,
more fitly ensouled.
And yet the poem is itself a classical sonnet, with an octave rhyming abba cddc
followed by a sestet rhyming eefgfg. In place of a classical turn or uolta after the
octave, however, there are two turns: in line 5, with a move into the subjunctive
in order to clarify and deepen the initial sense of the fragment's glowing, and
then in line 14, with the sudden and brutal ascription of quasi-agentive sight to
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the fragment, issuing in a rebuke to the viewer-subject, who falls under its gaze
and judgment. This rebuke, felt by the viewer-subject and addressed first to
himself and thence to us, his readers, is startling. But the eef gfg scheme of the
sestet houses this rebuke in a structure of strong formal coherence, giving a
sense of appropriateness and closure to the experience. Through the tightly
controlled form and images, the rebuke is earned by the experience as it is
registered in the poem itself. The poem itself, that is to say, strikes us, through its
form and images, as a composed, animated, ensouled whole, both rebuking us,
its readers, in the way that the fragment has rebuked the viewer-subject and
showing us concretely that the housing of expressive power in controlled surface
is still possible and commanding for us, even after the loss of the older dis
pensations. For the poet, and for us who follow and share in his experience, first
of the fragment and then of the poem itself as constructed, yet as it were a living
object, it remains possible for experience to mean something, possible to have
an adequate idea of an affection, with full investment in one's responses to
things, at least at times.
To be sure, this poem is in a way a fiction. It does not report a material rea
lity that is independent of subjectivity and discerned through practices of mea
surement. Rather it tells a story about an experience and its significance, where
the terms of significance involve a sense of emplotment and possibility in human
life that are not simply given in tradition or ordinary experience. That sense of
emplotment and possibility is itself felt, both by the poet initially and subsequently
by we who follow him, as shaped or contrived in human time, as first the frag
ment and then the poem have been shaped or contrived: we, like the poet, must
construct it. Yet this sense is also felt as inevitable, present, and altogether other
than arbitrarily invented: it is commanded of us in our contrivings by something
that makes itself manifest in the formal and thematic working through of
experience. In this working through, both the emplotment of this experience
and the relation of this particular emplotment to a larger emplotment of human
life are both constructed and accepted as given, by the poet and by us.
Perhaps we should not call what we get from deeply absorbing, cathartic, yet
contingency-acknowledging constructions of experience, knowledge. Even fram
ing the issue about the role of literature in our lives in terms of knowledge as it
is construed paradigmatically in the natural sciences expresses the philosopher's
characteristic bad faith in wanting everything circumscribed and life guided by
rationally obligatory rules. Yet we cannot live as human persons without this
literature; what we get from it is a sense of life in a human reality that is, if
marked by brute contingency, not everywhere dominated by it. Arriving at this
sense is a way of knowing by acknowledging what and where and how we are.
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